Montana Bar Admission Standards: A Comparative Study by Willey, Charles W.
Montana Law Review
Volume 20
Issue 2 Spring 1959 Article 6
January 1959
Montana Bar Admission Standards: A
Comparative Study
Charles W. Willey
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Montana Law
Review by an authorized editor of The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law.
Recommended Citation
Charles W. Willey, Montana Bar Admission Standards: A Comparative Study, 20 Mont. L. Rev. 195 (1958).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/6
NOTES
MONTANA BAR ADMISSION STANDARDS:
A COMPARATIVE STUDY
Lawyers nationwide have, in the past few years, become increasingly
aware of and concerned by the public's somewhat adverse view of the legal
profession. The problem is almost as ancient as the profession itself, but
only in the last few years have most American lawyers seriously considered
attempting to do anything about it.
It is entirely possible that an accelerated national public relations pro-
gram, similar to that conducted by the American Medical Association, might
have very beneficial effects. But the more basic need is for maintenance
and improvement of the caliber of the membership of the bar-both in
character and professional competence. This approach is predicated on
preventing entry to the profession by the proverbial few "bad apples."
Hence attention has recently centered on the question of whether admission
standards should be modified.
Prior to the 1959 legislative session, a group of Gallatin County attor-
neys prepared a draft bill which would have required a pre-law college de-
gree, an approved law school degree, and a bar examination of all candi-
dates for admission to the bar except those who had been admitted for two
years in another jurisdiction. The legislation was never introduced, but its
preparation illustrates the present-day interest of Montana attorneys in im-
proving standards. This Note is not intended to present any compre-
hensive proposals for revision of the existing rules, but rather to provide
the legal profession in Montana with a comparative appraisal of our current
admission standards, and to make a few very general suggestions.
MONTANA ADMISSION RULES
By Examination
The Montana rules governing admissions to the bar appear in part
XXV of the Rules of the Supreme Court, contained in volume 127 of the
Montana Reports.' The rules are supplemented by the code provisions gov-
erning attorneys.'
All applicants for admission to the bar must satisfy the following gen-
eral requirements: citizenship, good moral character, twenty-one years of
age, and bona fide residence in the state for at least six months prior to
application.
Pre-Law College Education
Applicants for admission by examination are faced with a contradic-
tory and anomalous requirement regarding pre-law college work. Rule
XXV B states the applicant must show
that he possesses qualifications equivalent to those which are re-
'The admissions rules have not been changed since they were published in 1954.
Letter from Chief Justice James T. Harrison to the author, March 16, 1959, on file
in the Montana Law Review office.
'RzvisiD CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 93-2001 to -2007, -2013 to -2015. (Herein-
after REVSmT CODES OF MONTANA are cited R.C.M.).
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quired of a 'regular' student who enters the Law Department of
the State University of Montana as an applicant for a degree; that
is to say, the evidence presented by him must satisfy the entrance
requirements of the University of Montana and in addition must
disclose that he has completed two years' work in a university or
college of recognized standing, or the equivalent. (Emphasis
added.)
In the past the rule has apparently been interpreted as requiring only two
years of pre-law college, or its equivalent. Applicants have been permitted
to show "equivalent" qualifications by passing a two-year college equi-
valency examination administered by the Montana State University com-
mittee on admission and graduation.! The difficulty with the above rule is
that Montana State University requires that college work be taken in resi-
dence, and since January 1, 1954, has required three years of pre-law col-
lege work as a prerequisite to law school admission.' This requirement
was effective the same month the court rules on bar admissions were amend-
ed, so the court was undoubtedly unaware of the change. Nevertheless, the
present rule is ambiguous as to whether two or three years of pre-law
collegiate study is required.
The rule is also ambiguous as to whether any particular grade average
is required for the pre-law study. The Montana State University School
of Law requires that all pre-law college work be completed "with a scholas-
tic average at least equal to the average required for giaduation in the
institution attended. . . "' The above-quoted rule is silent on this point,
but a passing average may be impliedly required.
Law Study
R.C.M. 1947, section 93-2002 requires "two successive years" of law
study as a general qualification, without specifying or limiting the form
of study. Rule XXV B does not impose any additional limitation. In
practice the rule has been interpreted as permitting the legal study to be
in law school, by correspondence, or by study in a law office.' The rule
does not specify any maximum period within which legal study must be
completed; it does not require students to register with the court or bar
examiners at the time they begin their legal training; nor does it require
that study in a law school be completed at a school approved by the
American Bar Association or the Association of American Law Schools.
At least until 1952, and possibly since that time, the court has been
very liberal in its interpretations of what constituted the "diligent study
of law for two successive years." On one occasion the court found satis-
factory compliance with the rule by a student who had failed the first year
of law school, repeated the entire course, and been dropped at the end of his
'Metcalf, A Survey on Admision to Practice Law in Montana, 13 MONT. L. REv. 1
(1952). Mr. Metcalf was writing in his then capacity of Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court of Montana. His conclusions, however, reflect only the practice of
the court up to that date. It is entirely possible that some of the court's detailed
interpretations and procedures have been changed since that date without this
author's knowledge.
41953 MONTANA STATE UNIvEasiTy BuLLmN (containing the 1953-1955 Catalog) 96.
51bid. See also the MONTANA STATE UNIvTESlTY 1958-59 GuIDEmOOK 51.
ONote 3 supra, at 5, 7, 8.
[Vol. 20,
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NOTES
second year.' No court supervision whatever has been exercised over stu-
dents studying by correspondence or in law offices; however for students
studying in law offices, the supervising attorneys make a statement to the
court regarding time spent studying law, etc.8
Moral Character Requirements
The rule on character requirements of examinees' states that the ap-
plicant "shall file with his petition the affidavit of each of three respon-
sible citizens, two of whom must be members of the Bar, stating that the
applicant is a person of good moral character, which affidavit must set
forth how long a time, when and under what circumstances affiant has
known the applicant." There is no universal requirement of any addi-
tional investigation, and no fingerprinting or police check is run in all
cases. However, Chief Justice Harrison has stated that "the court does
not rely exclusively on the character affidavits required by the rules, but
conducts such investigation as it feels necessary in each instance. This is
particularly true where the applicant is unknown to any member of the
court. " o
Of course the applicant must pass the examination, in addition to
fulfilling the other foregoing requirements, to be eligible for admission.
Further, the applicant must state an intention to actively practice law in
Montana if admitted.
Admission on Motion for Attorneys from Other Jurisdictions
An attorney admitted to practice in another jurisdiction who fulfills
the general qualifications of age, citizenship, and character, may be ad-
mitted without examination if he has actively practiced law in his former
jurisdiction for two successive years immediately prior to his Montana
application, and intends to actively practice law in Montana if admitted.'
In addition, he must furnish at his own expense a report of investigation
by the National Conference of Bar Examiners, concerning his character,
reputation, experience, and qualifications.
In his petition for admission by reciprocity, the attorney must specify
where and when he studied law; where he was first admitted to practice;
all places and times he has practiced; whether he has ever been subjected
to a disbarment or criminal proceeding, and the circumstances and re-
sults of any such proceeding. In addition to the report of investigation
by the N.C.B.E., the applicant must submit the same three affidavits of
good character required of examinees, and a "certificate of the presiding
judge of the highest court of record of the jurisdiction in which the peti-
tioner last practiced, . . . showing that the petitioner was of good reputa-
tion, and trustworthy in the practice of his profession as attorney and coun-
sellor-at-law in such jurisdiction.'""
'Note 3 8upra, at 8.
8Ibid.
'RuLEs OF THE SUPREME COURT OF MONTANA, 127 Mont. xxxi (1954), Rule XXV B 2.
"OLetter, note 1 mpra.
"Note 9 supra, Rule XXV C.
'Ibid. The requirement of R.O.M. 1947, § 93-2005, that an attorney seeking admis-
sion on motion shall produce his license to practice in the former jurisdiction,
would seem a mere formality in light of the requirement of this court certificate.
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Rule XXV A imposes the further limitation that admission by recipro-
city will not be extended on any more favorable terms than a Montana
attorney would be admitted on in the jurisdiction from which the petition-
ing attorney comes. Any restrictions of the latter jurisdiction are auto-
matically adopted.
The court reserves the right to require an examination of any attorney
seeking admission on motion.
There is, however, one provision in the rules on reciprocal admissions
which seems quite ambiguous. Rule XXV C 1 seems to clearly require
that any applicant for admission on motion must have "actively been
engaged in the practice of law for at least two years immediately prior to
his application here." On the next page of the rules, however, under sub-
division 2, the following appears: "if he has never practiced and not more
than one year has elapsed since his admission, he shall so state." (Em-
phasis added.) It would seem that this latter provision is either surplus-
age, or it authorizes admission on motion of attorneys who have been ad-
mitted in other jurisdictions but have never practiced. Which interpreta-
tion the court intended is not clear.
Diploma Privilege
R.C.M. 1947, section 93-2002, provides in part that
a diploma from the department of law of the university of
Montana at Missoula, or evidence of having completed the
course in law of three years of said department, shall entitle
the holder to a license to practice law in all courts of this state,
subject to the right of the chief justice of the supreme court
of the state to order an examination as in ordinary cases of
applicants without such diploma or evidence.
This portion of the statute has been in force since 1915.' Although the
court rules are silent regarding the diploma privilege, graduates of the
Montana State University School of Law have long been admitted on mo-
tion without examination. A separate section of this Note below will con-
sider the diploma privilege in detail.
ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The relative status of Montana's bar admission standards may be most
readily appreciated by comparing them with the standards of other juris-
dictions."' In order to illustrate the trend of current legal thinking regard-
ing admission standards, reference will frequently be made to the recom-
mendations of the American Bar Association and to the proposed Code of
Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners.' The proposed Code was
'Laws of Montana 1915, ch. 18, § 1, at 28.
"Bar admission requirements of jurisdictions other than Montana were obtained
from AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1958 REvImv OF LEGAL EDUCATION-LAw SCHOOLS
AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATEB 20-25, and from WEST
PUBLISHING CO., RULES FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (1957). The A.B.A. pamphlet
is accurate up to November 1, 1958. Every attempt has been made to correct the
information therein to reflect subsequent rules changes.
'rThe entire text of the proposed Code may be found in ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
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approved by the National Conference of Bar Examiners and the Associa-
tion of American Law Schools in 1958, and by the American Bar Associa-
tion in February, 1959.'
By Examination
Pre-law College Education
Only three jurisdictions have no requirement regarding pre-law col-
legiate training." The great majority require either two or three years of
pre-law work; twenty-three jurisdictions, including Montana require two
years of college or its equivalent.tm Twenty-one states and the District of
Columbia require three years of college.m However, of the jurisdictions
requiring three years, only two allow the substitution of an "equivalency
examination.' Only four states require graduation from college as a
prerequisite to law study,' and two of these, Delaware and Pennsylvania,
state it as merely an alternative.
Perhaps almost equally significant are the "recommended" standards.
Since 1952 the ABA standard for approval of law schools has specified that
such schools must require three years of acceptable college work as a
condition to admission to the study of law." The proposed Code of Recom-
mended Standards for Bar Examiners would also, require that "each ap-
plicant . . . have . .. three full years of successful college work before
beginning the study of law. . . ." Both of these standards do, however,
permit two years of pre-law college work if the student takes a four-year
law program.
Montana's rule requiring two years of pre-law college, or its equivalent,
is clearly on a par with most jurisdictions, though the decided tendency
is to require three years of such work. It would, however, seem unrealistic
to now impose any new standard in Montana requiring any more than three
years of pre-law college, in light of the fact that only a tiny minority of
jurisdictions now have such a requisite, and that such a requirement would
exceed even the ABA standard.
Law Study
In the area of legal study requirements, Montana's standards are
clearly less stringent than those of most jurisdictions.
Law office or correspondence school study. Twenty-five jurisdictions
"Letter from Dean George Neff Stevens. University of Washington School of Law,
to the author, March 5, 1959, on file in the Montana Law Review office. Dean
Stevens is chairman of the Association of American Law Schools Committee on
Admissions to the Bar.
"Alaska, Hawaii, Wyo.
'BArk., Cal., Colo., Fla., Guam, Ind., Iowa, Me., Md., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mont.,
Neb., Nev., N.M., N.C., ND., Ore., R.I., Vt., W. Va.
"Ala., Ariz., Conn., .D.C., Idaho, Ill., Ky., La., Minn., Mo., N.H., N.J., N.Y., Ohio,
Okla., S.D., Tenn., Tex., Utah, Va., Wash., Wis.
'oAla., Idaho.
inDel., Kan., Ohio, Pa. The requirement of graduation in Ohio will not go Into ef-
fect until 1960.
"Hervey, Change in A.B.A. Standards, 20 BAn ExAM. 144 (1951).
"Note 15 supra, § 8 at 54.
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permit law office study as a means of qualifying for the bar examination,"
but only California expressly permits correspondence school study. How-
ever, most of the states and territories permitting law office study require
more time than Montana does. Furthermore, thirteen of the states which
sanction office study supervise it much more closely than Montana does,
by requiring registration with the court or bar examiners at the time the
student commences his legal studies.'m  Ten of these thirteen require the
advance registration only if the projected course of study is exclusively in
a law office." This advance registration accomplishes a two-fold purpose:
first,, it gives the court or law examiners an opportunity to check on the
progress, course of study, and character traits of the student before he
reaches the stage of applying to take the bar examination; second, it gives
the court an accurate index of how long the student spends in obtaining
his legal training. Four states which permit law office study as an avenue
of qualification impose a maximum time limit within which the study must
be completed; the average maximum is six years."
Equally significant in evaluating Montana's standards are the length
the study periods required by the remaining jurisdictions which sanction
law office study. One jurisdiction, Guam, requires five years. Nine states
require four years if the applicant qualifies only by law office training.
Eleven states require three years study by law office applicants." Only
two states other than Montana permit law office students to take the bar
examination after two years study--Georgia and Mississippi. Wyoming
permits a two-year law office student to take the bar examination also,
but only if he has also completed one year of law school. Hence it would
appear that Montana is definitely below the standard of even the other
jurisdictions which sanction law office study, in allowing applicants with
only two years law office study to take the examination.
The majority of American jurisdictions-twenty-eight-do not allow
law office study at all as a means of qualifying for the bar examination.'
There can be no doubt that the trend is to eliminate law office study as a
means of qualification. During the last twenty-five years, apparently only
one authority has written in favor of law office study as a satisfactory type
of legal education.' That author, writing in 1936 as Secretary of the
Connecticut Bar Examining Committee, argued in support of retaining law
office study, but admitted that Connecticut had found that type of study
"Ark., Cal., Del., Ga., Guam, Idaho, Ill.. Kan., La., Mass., Me., Miss., Mont., N.C.,
N.D., N.H., N.Y., Pa., R.I., S.C., Tex., Va., Vt., Wash., Wyo. Only Wyoming re-
quires that the law office study be in conjunction with some law school study.
'Cal., Del., Idaho, Kan., La., Mass., N.C., N.D., N.Y., R.I., Tex., Vt., Va.
mArk., Idaho, Kan., La., Mass., N.D., N.Y., R.I., Vt., Va. Section 11 of the pro-
posed Code, note 15 supra, at 51, would also require advance registration.
"Idaho, 5 years; N.C., Tex., Wash., 6 years.
"Ark., Cal., Idaho, Ill., N.Y., Pa., R.I., Vt., Wash.
"Del., Kan., La., Me., Mass., N.H., N.C., N.D., S.C., Tex., Va.
tmAla., Alaska, Ariz., Colo., Conn., D.C., Fla., Hawaii, Ind., Iowa, Ky., Md., Mich.,
Minn., Mo., Neb., Nev., N.M., Ohio, Okla., Ore., P.R., S.D., Tenn., Utah, V.I., W.
Va., Wis. Alaska rules on thls point were changed in 1955, so that state still per-
mits law office qualification by students whose legal clerkships were begun prior
to the effective date of the new law.
mBoardman, Office Study Requirement8 in Connecticut and Their Enforcement, 8
AM. LAw. S. Rsv. 622 (1936).
[Vol. 20,
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unsatisfactory when not carefully supervised.' He further admitted that
"the superiority of law school instruction over law office instruction, at
least as far as success in passing the bar examination is concerned, is im-
mediately apparent.' ' Connecticut has since entirely abandoned the law
office study system, and now requires law school graduation as an absolute
prerequisite to taking the bar examination.
The only recent article on law office study, written by the Dean of St.
Johns Law School, urged abolition of the New York rule allowing such
training, in the following words :"
In view of (1) the exceedingly small number of applicants for the
bar examination who are not law school graduates. (2) the impos-
sibility of giving adequate official supervision to their education,
and (3) the unsatisfactory results of that education, it would seem
that the time has come to reconsider the policy of continuing to per-
mit such haphazard preparation for the legal profession.
The proposed Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Examiners
takes probably the most positive position on what type of legal training
should be required.' It provides, "Each applicant should be required to
graduate from a law school approved by the American Bar Association
before being eligible to take a bar examination. None of the following
should be substituted for law school training:
a. private study, correspondence school or law office training;
b. age or experience;
c. waived or lowered standards of legal training for particular groups
or persons."
The ABA recommendations regarding legal training oppose any type
of legal education obtained wholly outside a law school."
Illustrative of the trend against law office qualification ig the fact that
recent rules changes adopted in Alaska, South Carolina and South Dakota
abolished the previous authorizations of law office study as an avenue to
qualification for the bar examination.'
Perhaps the most relevant consideration for Montana lawyers, how-
ever, is the experience of the Montana State Board of Law Examiners re-
garding the relative performance of law office and correspondence school
students. In reply to a query on this point, Mr. Ralph J. Anderson, Chair-
man of the Board of Law Examiners, stated he believes that a "graduate
of a law school of standing has about a three to one better chance of passing
the examination than a graduate of La Salle or a student in a law office.
Id. at 623.
"Id. at 625.
sTinnelly, Further Comments on Law Office Study, 4 BROOKL. BA. 142, 146 (1953).
"Note 15 supra, § 9 at 54.
"AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, 1958 REViEw OF LEGAL EDUCATIoN-LAW SCHOOLS
AND BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES 20.
wNew Rules in South Carolina, 26 BAR EXAM. 129 (1957) ; New Rules in South
Dakota, 26 BAR EXAM. 91 (1957) ; New Rules in Alaska, 25 BAR EXAM. 2 (1956).
1959] NOTES
7
Willey: Montana Bar Admission Standards
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1958
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
However, ... we do have graduates of La Salle who pass a very creditable
examination and I recall one doing so on an examination when two gradu-
ates of Harvard failed the same examination. "'
From these illustrations it would appear that MontAna standards per-
mitting law office and correspondence school qualifications for the bar ex-
amination are substantially below almost all other jurisdictions, and are
definitely not in keeping with the current trends.
Law School Training. Montana's standard requiring diligent study
of the law for "at least two successive years (twenty-four months)" is
most deficient when compared with the requirements of other jurisdictions
regarding resident law school study. One state-Wisconsin-requires four
years of resident law school. Twenty-three jurisdictions require a law
degree as an absolute requisite, though the degree is almost always ob-
tained in three years.' Three jurisdictions require three years of law
school of all applicants, but do not require the degree. '
Fourteen states and Guam have rules authorizing legal education
qualification by a law degree, as an alternative to qualifications by three
years of law school or a specified amount of time of office study." Eleven
states allow applicants with three years of law school to take the bar ex-
amination; but this again is but an alternative to qualification by office
study in all of them except Indiana."
Only Georgia and Montana allow an applicant with only two years
of law school to qualify to take the bar examination.
The ABA standards recommend that all applicants be required to have
completed three years of full-time law school study.'" The proposed Code
for bar examiners would demand that eligibility to take the bar examina-
tion be limited to graduates of ABA-approved law schools."
Of the jurisdictions specifying some amount of law school work, forty-
three require that the school be either ABA or state approved. Thirty
require ABA (or Association of American Law Schools) approval;' the
other thirteen apparently require only state approval, though some of the
rules are ambiguous as to exactly what body must grant the approval."
The failure of the Montana rules to require approval, either state or
MLetter from Mr. Ralph J. Anderson to the author, March 9, 1959, on file in the
Montana Law Review office.
*Alaska, Ariz., Colo., Conn., Fla., Hawaii, Iowa, Ky., Md., Mich., Minn., Neb., Nev.,
N.J., N.M., Ohio, Okla., Ore.,, P.R., S.D., Tenn., Utah, V.I.
"*D.C., Mo., W. Va.
"Cal., Del., Guam, Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Mass., Miss., N.H., N.Y., Pa., R.I., Va.,
Wash.
"Cal., Del., Ind., La., Me., N.C., N.D., S.C., Tex., Vit., Wyo. As to Wyoming, see
note 24 supra. Only California also permits substitution of correspondence study.
"Note 36 8upra.
"Note 35 supra, and accompanying text.
"Alaska, Ariz., Del., Fla., Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Ind., Kan., Ky., La., Mich.,
Minn., Miss., Mo., Neb., Nev. N.H., N.J., N.M., Ohio, Okla., Pa., P.R., S.D., Tex.,
Va., W. Va., Wis. However, Minnesota and Mississippi both allow an exception
for a single specified school within the state, which is approved by the state. The
Minnesota school has been approved by the ABA since its consolidation into the
William Mitchell College of Law. The Mississippi school-Jackson School of Law
-is still on the "not approved" list. See note 36 supra, at 10, 17.
"Ark., Cal., Colo., Conn., D.C., Me., Md., N.Y., N.C., Ore., R.I., Wash., Wyo.
[Vol. 20,
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ABA, of a law school in order to have the credits it grants acceptable as
proof of legal education, leaves this state in a small minority position. The
statistics noted below, under the heading "Relative Performance of Ap-
plicants on the Montana Bar Examination," show conclusively that grad-
uates of non-approved law schools do consistently poorer on the bar ex-
amination than do graduates of approved law schools.
Moral Character Requirements. Of all the facets of the legal profes-
sion, the moral character of its members has been the factor most discussed
by those interested irA preservation of the honor and dignity of this ancient
profession. It is undoubtedly the factor most responsible for the recent
decline in the popular status of the profession. The fundamental canon
in this area was laid down half a century ago by the Supreme Court of
South Carolina in these words: "The three main requisites [of a lawyer]
are learning, diligence, integrity; but the greatest of these is integrity.'
The absolute necessity of uniformly good moral character among at-
torneys is self-evident in light of (1) the trust and confidence of their
clients, (2) the fact that the bar furnishes a large measure of both moral
and political leadership in the community, and (3) the fact that the mem-
bers of the bar are the source of judges, legislators, and executive officers."
In nineteen jurisdictions, including Montana, the only character in-
quiry made in all cases is satisfied by the submission of affidavits or
certificates of good character, usually executed by attorneys of the examin-
ing jurisdiction.' The number of affidavits required varies from two to
five, but the average is three, as the Montana rules prescribe. Five juris-
dictions run routine character investigations on all or most applicants.'
Three states require a good character certificate from the applicant's law
school ;' four other states require that the character certificate be executed
by a supervising attorney, local county board, or county court."
Nineteen jurisdictions apparently do not require either character af-
Fidavits or investigations of regular examinees." It is, of course, possible
that some or all of these states and possessions do have some sort of char-
acter evaluation requirements.
However, in keeping with the current trend emphasizing character
investigation, nine states require that all examinees be fingerprinted. "
'In re Duncan, G4 S.C. 461, 482, 42 S.E. 433, 440 (1902). See also Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1867) ; In re Lavine, 2 Cal. 2d 324, 41 P.2d 161, 162
(1935).
"Comment, 2 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 224 (1955).
"Ala., Colo., Conn., Ga., Hawaii, Idaho, Ill., Kan., Mass., Miss., Mo., Mont., Neb.,
N.M., N.Y., Okla., Ore., P.R., Utah.
D.C., Md., Mich., Miss. (required only of applicants who have not been residents
of the state for 5 years), Mo.
"lInd., Ky., Wis.
'Preceptor's certificate: Del., R.I.; local county law board's approval: Pa.;
certificate from county court: Tenn. (The "preceptor" is the attorney in whose
office a student performs a legal clerkship. Five Jurisdictions-Del., N.J., Pa.,
R.I., Vt.-require all examinees to perform an office clerkship, over and above
graduation from law school or other legal training, as a prerequisite to admission.
All except N.J. require 6 months; N.J. prescribes 9 months.)
"Alaska, Ark., Guam, Iowa, La., Me., Minn., N.H., N.C., N.D., S.C., S.D., Tex.,
Vt., V.I., Va., Wash., W. Va., Wyo.
"Ariz., Cal., Fla., Idaho, Mich., Mo., Nev., N.J., Ohio.
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The fingerprints are usually checked with the police department of the
applicant's home town, and with the FBI central fingerprint files. Those
states which require fingerprinting feel that it serves two functions: (1) it
catches "hidden" criminal records and acts as a check against the appli-
cant's own certifications regarding his prior record, and (2) it acts as a
deterrent, so that persons having criminal records are discouraged from
ever applying for examination in those states.' In Michigan, for example,
the first fingerprinting check showed that almost seven per cent of the
applicants had fingerprint records; the next bar examination group, how-
ever, yielded only slightly more than two per cent with fingerprint records.'
An area like Montana probably would not yield a fingerprint record
rate which would compare with those found in the heavily-populated
metropolitan areas of California, Florida, or Michigan. Nonetheless, the
opinion of the Director of the National Conference of Bar Examiners, based
on experience obtained in character investigations since 1936, is that there
is a nationwide need for more comprehensive character inquiries on appli-
cants initially taking the bar examination, as well as on attorneys who
have previously been admitted in other jurisdictions." That author also
points out that a criminal record may be well established long before an
individual graduates from law school,' because
The F.B.I. Uniform Crime Reports show that persons under twenty-
five were responsbile for 75 per cent of the arrests for burglary,
60 per cent of the arrests for theft, 80 per cent for auto thefts,
and over 40 per cent for violations of the Narcotic Drug Laws.
The thought of requiring fingerprinting of all bar examination ap-
plicants may seem shocking to a militant civil libertarian, because it smacks
of an invasion of personal privacy and to some may carry an imputation
of dishonesty. However, the report on Michigan's experience with finger-
printing was made after the program had been in operation there for two
years, and up to that time not a single applicant had protested the taking
of his fingerprints.' It would also seem that the mere requirement of
fingerprinting has now lost any imputation of dishonesty which it might
once have carried. Fingerprinting is now required of anyone entering
the military service, and in several states of anyone applying for a driv-
er's license.
Such a precautionary measure as fingerprinting obviously will not
reveal all those persons who may have insufficient moral stamina to with-
stand the temptations presented to a practicing lawyer, but that process
should reveal most of those persons who have already proven themselves to
be of questionable character. However, if fingerprinting were required,
definite precautions should be taken to insure that no applicant who can
satisfactorily explain a fingerprint record is arbitrarily denied admission.
'Hepburn, Fingerprinting-Two-Way Protection, 25 BAR EXAM. 17-20 (1956).
"Id. at 18, 19.
'Merritt, Smokey the Bear: Guarding Law Schools and Lawyers, 25 BAR EXAM.
101 (1956).
'eId. at 103.
"Note 55 supra, at 18.
[Vol. 20,
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Michigan has adopted a two-stage referral procedure to avoid any such
arbitrariness. Under that procedure an applicant on whom an adverse
fingerprint report is received is recalled for further questioning by the
chairman of the character sub-committee; if the sub-committee does not
uanimously approve the applicant, a special report is made to the Board
of Law Examiners, and that body as a whole passes on the acceptability of
the applicant.'
An alternative or supplement to fingerprinting is a requirement that
the applicant fill out and swear to a detailed and highly specific moral
character questionnaire. The Montana rules require that a fairly compre-
hensive questionnaire be incorporated in the petition of an out-of-state
attorney seeking admission on motion, but no such interrogatory is ap-
parently required of regular examinees. The Montana State University
School of Law now requires that every law student fill out a detailed
character questionnaire at the time he enters law school; he must then
bring it up to date at the beginning of each subsequent year of law school,
and again immediately before graduation.
It would seem that the present character inquiries made by Montana
of attorneys seeking admission by reciprocity, might well be extended to
all-regular examinees. If the questionnaire now in use by the Law Shcool
were found inappropriate for general use, the Director of the National Con-
ference of Bar Examiners has published a suggested character questionnaire
which might be acceptable."' If such a sworn questionnaire is required, it
serves at least two purposes: (1) the requirement of verification is more
likely to encourage the applicant to divulge any past "record," especially
if the questionnaire carries the warning that concealment of a criminal
record will warrant disbarment; and (2) if a prior criminal record sub-
sequently comes to light, the concealment itself is evidence of fraud on the
part of the individual involved.
The recommendations of national agencies regarding character ex-
amination are also illuminating. The standard recommended by the Na-
tional Conference of Bar Examiners would require the following :'
(1) that every potential applicant register with the court or examining
authority at the time he begins his law studies;
(2) that a local attorney be assigned as the "sponsor" of each student;
(3) that each applicant fill out a questionnaire regarding his char-
acter, and submit it on affidavit;
(4) that the law examiners personally interview each applicant for
examination.
More reecntly the proposed Code of Recommended Standards for Bar Ex-
aminers has taken the very positive position that no applicant should be
approved for admission to the bar until his moral character has been ap-
proved, and that the responsibility for thoroughly investigating the char-
'Hepburn, Character and Fitne88-Not a Myth, 34 MIcH. S.B.J. 29, 30 (Feb. 1955).
6'Note 57 supra, at 111, 112.
'Character Investigation, 18 BAR ExAM. 89 (1949).
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acter of each applicant should rest on the bar examining authority or
separate committees.6'
If Montana does elect to change its current character requirements,
care should be taken with respect to any requirement of security, loyalty,
or non-Communist oaths. In the case of Re Anastaplo,.' the Supreme Court
of Illinois upheld the bar examiners' denial of admission of an applicant
who swore to uphold the state and federal constitutions, but refused to
answer questions regarding membership in Communist or other subversive
organizations. However, in the cases of Schware v. Board of Bar Examin-
ers,' and Konigsberg v. State Bar of California," the Supreme Court of the
United States reversed the state supreme courts of New Mexico and Cali-
fornia, which had respectively upheld denial of admission of the two peti-
tioners to the practice of law. The basis for the Court's holding in each
case was that prior membership in the Communist party would not, by it-
self and in light of the other considerations in each of those cases, be suf-
ficient evidence of bad moral character to sustain a denial of bar admission
on that ground.' The Court went on to say that the state decisions uphold-
ing such exclusions were violative of the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. The effect of these two decisions may extend into
areas other than those directly involved in the cases, because the Court's
opinion in the Konigsberg case contained this statement :"
We recognize the importance of leaving States free to select their
own bars, but it is equally important that the State not exercise
this power in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner nor in such a
way as to impinge on the freedom of political expression or asso-
ciation. A bar composed of lawyers of good character is a worthy
objective but it is unnecessary to sacrifice vital freedoms in order
to obtain that goal. It is also important both to society and the bar
itself that lawyers be unintimidated-free to think, speak, and act
as members of an Independent Bar.
From the foregoing discussion it would appear that while Montana's
requirement of good character affidavits is on a par with at least half of
the other jurisdictions, this state has not elected to follow the current trend
of prescribing more intensive investigation of the character of bar ap-
plicants. A report on character requirements, prepared in 1951 for the
Survey of the Legal Profession, described Montana's relative status in
these words:'
Montana is an illustration of extreme informality. There is no
statute and no court rule governing inquiry into the character and
fitness of an applicant for admission to the bar. An applicant
furnishes certificates of good character which are referred to the
*Note 15 supra, §§ 10, 12, at 54, 55.
0-3 Il. 2d 471, 121 N.E.2d 826 (1954).
353 U.S. 232 (1957).
4353 U.S. 252 (1957).
'Schaware case, 353 U.S. at 246, 247; Konigsberg case, 353 U.S. at 267, 271.
53 U.S. at 273.
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Attorney General, "who presumably makes some inquiry." The
Board of Law Examiners who pass on character are well dis-
tributed over the state and apt to have some knowledge of the ap-
plicant.
The statement of Chief Justice Harrison, noted earlier herein,"0 clearly in-
dicates that the above-quoted report is not entirely accurate. Nonetheless,
the practices of the Montana court regarding character inquiry have not
been crystallized into a rule or statute; and the ordinary applicant cannot
reasonably be expected to know what type of character inquiry he will have
to answer, beyond the affidavits he files with his petition. It would seem
that some clarification and possibly some modification of the rules on this
point might well be desirable.
Reciprocity in Other Jurisdictions
Number of Years Practice Required
The Montana rule is unique in permitting attorneys admitted to prac-
tice in other jurisdictions to be admitted here on motion, after only two
years of practice in their former jurisdiction. Only four other states have
a less stringent requirement on this point ;' those four do not specify any
length of period of practice as a prerequisite to admission by reciprocity,
though all of them require some practice. The other states and possessions
require periods of prior practice varying from ten to three years, the aver-
age being about five years, for admission without examination.
Four jurisdictions require ten years of prior practice. One state-
Pennsylvania-prescribes eight years. New Mexico and Texasrequire seven
years practice. The majority of all American jurisdictions--twenty-seven
-require that an attorney have practiced five years in his prior jurisdic-
tions." Nine states require that he have practiced three years."
Character Investigation on Reciprocity Admissions
In 1954 the National Conference of Bar Examiners stated that forty-
two states, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and Guam used its character
investigation service in determining the qualifications of out-of-state at-
torney applicants.' Our existing rules make Montana one of these states;
however, the N.C.B.E. did not specify what jurisdictions used its service,
nor whether all of them used it in all cases. The West digest of admission
rules" only indicates nine jurisdictions as requiring an N.B.C.E. report of
investigation in all cases," although a great many more states undoubtedly
"See text accompanying note 10 8upra.
T"Alaska, Ill., Nev., N.Y. (All the statistics on reciprocity are taken from the West
publication, note 14 supra.)
'Fla., Hawaii, La., R.I.
"Ariz., Conn., D.C., Ga., Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Md., Mass., Minn., Miss., Mo.,
Neb., N.H., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., P.R., S.C., S.D., Tenn., V.I., W.Va., Wis., Wyo.
"Ark., Colo., Del., Me., Mich., Ore., Utah, Vt., Va.
6Misisaippi Rolls Along, 23 BAR EXAM. 122 (1954).
"Note 14 8supr.
"D.C., Mass., Mich., Miss., Mo., N.Y., Ohio, Okla., Tenn.
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have the same requirement. Five states and Guam require a character
investigation of an unspecified nature."
The proposed Code for bar examiners urges that "Each state should
use the investigating services of the National Conference of Bar Examiners
in checking the character of an attorney-applicant seeking admission to
practice. '
Any change in Montana's rules on this phase of admissions would seem
to be unnecessary.
Good Standing in State of Prior Practice
The great majority of American jurisdictions-thirty-five-require that
an attorney applying for admission on motion give proof of good standing
in his former state of practice, as of the time he left that jurisdiction.'
Ordinarily the proof must take the form of a certificate from an attorney
of the former jurisdiction, the secretary of the bar association, a judge
before whom the applicant has practiced, a clerk of court, or a judge of
the state's highest court. The Montana rule requiring a certificate of good
reputation and trustworthiness, executed by the presiding judge of the
highest state court of the applicant's former jurisdiction, is a commendable
standard and should require no revision.'
Jurisdictions Requiring Examination of All Attorney-Applicants
Five jurisdictions-Alabama, California, Guam, Idaho, and Washing-
ton-require that all attorneys take an examination before being admitted.
These jurisdictions have entirely abandoned reciprocal admission on mo-
tion. In Alabama and Guam out-of-state attorneys take the same examina-
tion required of other applicants. In California, on the other hand, there
is a separate examination for experienced practitioners, which is apparently
different from that given the other examinees.
Three of the states requiring examination of experienced practitioners
also prescribe a set amount of previous practice. California requires four
years practice. while Idaho and Washington each require five years.
Alabama and Kentucky require that any attorney seeking admission
be a law school graduate.
IS A NATIONAL OR UNIFORM BAR EXAMINATION
THE SOLUTION?
For a number of years the National Conference of Bar Examiners, as
well as a number of leading practitioners in various states, have urged that
the legal profession adopt a uniform, national bar examination. So far,
the idea has not gained much acceptance by the individual states. One pro-
ponent has characterized the slow acceptance of the idea this way: "the
"Iowa, N.H., S.D., Wash. Wyo.
"Note 15 supra, § 12, at 54, 55.
'Alaska, Ark., Colo., Fla., Ga., Idaho, Ill., Ind., Iowa, Me., Md., Mich., Minn., Mo.,
Nev., N.H., N.J., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Ore., P.R., R.I., S.C., S.D.,
Tenn., Tex., Utah, V.I., Va., Wash., W. Va., Wyo.
'Rule XXV C 2, 127 Mont. lii (1954).
[Vol. 20,
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show first went into rehearsal some twenty years ago, and we haven't yet
got it on the road."'
The leading article in support of a national bar examination appeared
in 1950.' It was an official report to the council which administered the
national Survey of the Legal Profession. The author argued that four
factors made a uniform, national examination both desirable and neces-
sary."
(1) No uniformity exists in the quality of bar examinations
given in the different examining and admitting jurisdictions.
(2) There is very little uniformity to be found in the quality
of bar examinations given within the same examining and admit-
ting jurisdiction.
(3) No uniformity whatsoever appears in the standard of
grading answers in the different examining and admitting juris-
dictions.
(4) As traditionally and currently set, the typical bar ex-
amination is not an accurate test of the training that has been and
is being offered by the better law schools of the country.... To-
gether, [these objections] . . . are so serious that one cannot rea-
sonably look forward to their eradication so long as bar examina-
tions are formulated and the answers read and graded by each of
[the] . . .examining jurisdictions.
Opposition to a national bar examination is undoubtedly based prim-
arily on the feeling that the examination should, to at least some extent,
test the applicant's knowledge of the local state law. Yet "the American
Bar Association Section on Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar
has been trying to get the law schools away from the teaching of local law
and towards a national approach. "'s In this same vein, the proposed Code
for bar examiners provides in part that "questions should not be designed
to require answers based upon local case or statutory law. However, sub-
jects of substantial local importance may be included. '"" A survey of the
scope and content of bar examinations in 1953, however, indicated that a
gradual shift is taking place, toward testing primarily on questions of
national scope and avoiding coverage of local law except on practice and
procedure. The survey showed that only eight states asked questions in-
volving local law on all examination subjects. Twenty-three states indicated
they regularly asked questions involving the local law on civil procedure;
a few of these jurisdictions also asked local-law questions on other subjects.
Eight states said that even where questions of local law were involved, they
gave credit for well reasoned answers, even though the answers might be
2Dean Johnston of Denver, quoted in Glenn, A National Conference of Bar Examin-
ers' Service, 22 BAR EXAM. 24, 25 (1953).
"Clark, Bar Examinations: Should They Be Nationally Administered, 36 A.B.A.J.
986 (1950), and SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, BAR EXAMINATIONS AND RE-
QUIREMENT8 FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR 439, 453 (1952).
836 A.B.A.J. at 1054.
O'Stevens in Panel Discussion, A Uniform Bar Examination, 22 BAR EXAM. 4, 8
(1953).
"Note 15 supra, § 18, at 55.
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wrong or neglect any mention of the local law. Nine states attempted to
avoid local-law questions in any area.'
Other professions such as medicine, dentistry and accounting, have
successfully utilized a national examination. Such examinations are not
accepted in all states, but are accepted entirely or in part by a substantial
number of jurisdictions. As of 1950, a certificate from the National Board
of Medical Examiners was accepted as proof of professional competency
in all but seven states and two possessions; the uniform examination of
the American Institute of Accountants was accepted in all but two
states."
There is admittedly a greater variation in the jurisprudence of the
states than there is in their respective medical and accounting practices.
Nonetheless, a move toward a greater standardization of the subject mat-
ter, quality, and grading of bar examinations would seem to be in keeping
with two other trends of the law toward greater standardization: (1) the
ever-increasing state adoption of acts promulgated by the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, and (2) the trend to-
ward standardization of state procedure through adoption of the Federal
Rules.
Illustrative of the trend of legal thinking on this point is the fact
that in 1940 the Committee on Cooperation with Bench and Bar, Associa-
tion of American Law Schools, recommended that the Association "go on
record in favor of a National Bar Examination." The recommendation
was accepted by the member law schools by a vote of 50 to 21.'
Operation of the National Question Pool
If a majority of the states ultimately prove unwilling to accept a stand-
ard, national bar examination, there is still a second factor which can and
should work toward greater uniformity. In 1953 the National Conference
of Bar Examiners instituted a pooling system for bar examination ques-
tions and answers. It is administered by the Bar Examination Service
Committee. The gist of the arrangement is that the committee collects
questions and answers on various subjects from both the bar examiners
and the law schools in the respective states. It then publishes a catalog
of the available questions, giving a brief digest of each. The bar examiners
of any jurisdiction may select from the digest questions which they desire
to use, and the complete question, including answer, is sent to them.
As of August, 1957, forty-six jurisdictions had drawn a total of some
2950 questions from the pool, and twenty-five states and territories had
submitted questions. At that time, Montana had drawn questions from the
pool once, but had not contributed to it.*
It would seem that Montana can benefit materially from continued
'Note 85 supra, at 8, 9.
s"Note 83 supra, at 1054.
'Committee Report, submitted as an Appendix to a panel discussion on standards
for bar examiners, 26 BAR EXAM. 125, 128 (1957).
"Progress of Bar ERaminaion. Service Committee, 27 B~a ExAm. 37-41 (1958).
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participation in this national pool. However, inasmuch as the pool is a
reciprocal arrangement, dependent on its users for replenishment, it would
also seem that Montana should make contributions commensurate with
the extent to which it uses the central source.
HOW RELIABLE IS A BAR EXAMINATION IN TESTING
LEGAL KNOWLEDGE?
It is rather amazing to find that not very much is known about the
real accuracy of bar examinations in testing legal knowledge. This fact
was frankly admitted in a 1956 speech by the President of the New York
State Board of Law Examiners in these words: ' "Is it not strange that
we examiners from all over the United States know very little about what
we are doing? We do not know whether our grades are reliable or whether
we are doing a good job, a bad job, or an indifferent job. It would seem
that in this age of research, bar examining is still in the horse-and-buggy
stage."
However, a few studies have been done in this area, and all of them
so far indicate a reasonably good correlation between the law school records
of examinees and their performance on the bar examination. Illinois did
such a study, involving eight law schools, for the five-year period between
1929 and 1933. The results showed that "to an amazing degree the suc-
cess of a candidate for the bar was forecast by his law school record."
More recently the dean of an Illinois law school has said that his school
consistently finds a 70% correlation between law school grades and bar
examination results.'
As of 1956 only six states had made systematic appraisals of their bar
examinations. California and New York have done statistical studies on
their examinations for several years." Statistics released by New York
for its July, 1951, bar examination showed an average correlation of al-
most 70% on substantive law questions; the average was slightly lower
on questions involving adjective law, and in both cases the index varied
from school to school. This was considered an "excellent correlation."'
Of course the law school record itself is not necessarily an accurate
measure of an individuals legal knowledge and ability, but it is the best
available indicium.
Free Evaluation Service for Bar Examinations
At present the National Conference of Bar Examiners "is prepared
to furnish, without cost, a study and analysis of the performance of
the examination in any state which would like to participate in this pro-
"DeGraff, Bar Examination Grades-Are They Reliable?, 25 BAR EXAM. 7, 8 (1956).
'Garman, Correlation of Law School Records and Bar Examination Results, 8 AM.
LAW S. REv. 943, 944 (1937).
"Fitzgerald, Examinations for Law Schools and for the Bar: A Comparison, 26
BAR EXAM. 41, 44 (1957).
"Note 91 supra, at 8.
'Nadell, Publication of Bar Examination Statistics, 22 BAR EXAM. 48, 53, 54 (1953).
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gram." This evaluation service is operated by the Bar Examination
Service Committee, which also administers the national question pool. As
of 1956 the bar examinations of four states had been statistically evaluated.
The analyses showed that' "in these four states, both large and small, the
examination performs very well and correlates satisfactorily with law
school averages. "
Most bar examiners would probably agree with the position taken by
Dean Stevens of the University of Washington School of Law; he feels
that while bar examinations admittedly are not perfect, they are the best
testing vehicles available and should be continued. Dean Stevens believes
that the continued high attrition rate on bar examinations is justified, on
the theory that the examination approximates problems encountered in
actual practice, both as to massiveness of the problems presented, and their
timing; i.e., the encountering of the problems long after the individual
has studied the particular area in law school."
However, in light of the fact that the bar examinations are undoubted-
ly here to stay, it would seem that every effort should be made to make
them as accurate a reflection as possible of the legal knowledge and reason-
ing power of the examinees. Montana apparently has not yet taken ad-
vantage of the free N.C.B.E. evaluation service. Although the small
number of examinees would limit its accuracy, perhaps such an evaluation
would be one step toward an improved Montana bar examination.
THE MONTANA BAR EXAMINATION
Procedural Operation
Examiners
The present Montana State Board of Law Examiners consists of Ralph
J. Anderson, Helena, Chairman; Ralph G. Wiggenhorn, Billings; H. Cleve-
land Hall, Great Falls; Howard A. Johnson, Butte; and Russell E. Smith,
Missoula. Mr. Edward C. Mulroney, Missoula, was a Board member until
April 1, 1959.
The Board's membership remains quite stable, inasmuch as members
are replaced only upon resignation. The present chairman, for example,
has been on the Board since 1943 and has been chairman since 1950. He
is a former Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Montana.
Members of the Board are appointed by the Supreme Court, in ac-
cordance with the discretion lodged in the court by statute." The statute
gives the court an option as to whether it will require the assistance of the
examiners. However, the court has apparently conducted the examination
itself on only one occasion.' Men appointed to the Board have uniformly
been from among Montana's most eminent and respected practitioners.
'DeGraff, Testing the Effectiveness of the Program, 23 BAR ExAM. 13, 14 (1954).
"Note 91 supra, at 8.
"Stevens, Are Bar Examinations Unrealistic?, 26 BAB ExAM. 58 (1957).
"R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2013.
'"Metcalf, A Survey on Admission to Practice Law in Montana, 13 MONT. L. REv. 1
(1952), especially at n.1.
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NOTES
Board members are paid $20.00 per day plus travel expenses for the an-
nual three-day examination, but receive no compensation for preparation
of questions and other duties.' Hence Board membership is, to a high
degree, an honorary and gratuitous service. Unless and until more funds
and/or more assistance is provided to the examiners, the bar cannot expect
them to assume the burden of any additional duties, such as time-consuming
character investigations. Perhaps part of the burden of some of the ad-
ditional activities which may be necessary to make Montana's standards
conform with those of other states could be borne by committees of the
bar association.
Questions
Examination questions are prepared by each of the members of the
Board. Proposed questions are then circulated among the entire mem-
bership for comment, and when agreed upon are submitted to the chair-
man. He makes the final selection of the questions which will appear on
the examination. Each question submitted is answered by the submitting
member, and the answer substantiated by case or other legal authority.
All questions are rewritten each year, so that successive examinations never
contain duplicate questions.
The questions are hypothetical essay problems, designed to test the
applicant's reasoning power. No "yes" or "no" questions are used.
(Contrary to general supposition as to their effectiveness, New York has
been using about three hundred "yes-no" questions on each examination,
and has found better correlation with law school averages than is re-
flected by essay questions.)'
Montana does occasionally ask definitional questions, but the use of
such questions is apparently rare.
Administration of the Examination
The examination is administered in the Capitol building, and is super-
vised throughout by a representative of the Supreme Court. Typewriting
is allowed.
Time
The Montana examination is administered over a three-day period.
A table published in 1952 in a volume on bar examinations prepared for
The Survey of the Legal Profession showed that Montana ordinarily asked
about 100 questions, and allowed an average of nine minutes per ques-
tion.M Only two other jurisdictions--Arizona and Arkansas-average such
periods of time per bar examination essay question.
-"Information as to the current rate of compensation was obtained from Mr. E. C.
Mulroney. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2014 provides for the examiners' compensation. All
information regarding the examination procedure was verified by both Mr. Mul-
roney and the chairman, Mr. Ralph J. Anderson.
i IeGraff in General Discussion following the article cited in note 96 supra, 23 BAR
EXAM. 16,19 (1954).
"3SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PuoFmSsiox, BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR
ADMISSION TO THE BAR 376, 377 (1952).
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Grading
Examinations are graded on a one-to-ten numerical basis. Papers are
identified only by number, so the Board members never know the identity
of any author of an examination paper until after the grading is com-
pleted and the grades recorded.
Preliminary Qualifications
The Board of Law Examiners is not presently responsible for deter-
mining the preliminary qualifications of the applicants. That function
is handled by the Supreme Court itself; the list of applicants qualified
to take the examination is certified to the examiners by the court. Hence
the Board does not impose any moral character standards, or conduct any
investigations of applicants. As previously noted herein, the proposed
Code for bar examiners advocates a change in this situation, so as to
charge the examining authority with both investigations of character and
ultimate determinations of fitness.' The Code also seemingly advocates
that the examiners determine the pre-legal qualifications of the appli-
cants.' However, it apparently contemplates that if the examiners bore
all these responsibilities they would be considerably assisted by the state
bar association or special committees. The Code does not seem to advocate
any shift from the idea that the examiners are agents of the Supreme Court,
and carry out their responsibilities in the court's name.
The Code does, however, suggest three additional items which would
be new for Montana:
(1) Require all students who intend to ultimately take the Mon-
tana bar to register with the examining authority at the beginning of
their law study.' This would allow the examiners some information on
and control over the length of time within which the applicants complete
their legal studies.
(2) Publish the results of each examination, showing the success of
applicants according to pre-legal education, type of law training, whether
they were law school graduates, and whether the law schools they attended
were approved by the ABA.'
(3) Conduct periodic studies to determine the effectiveness of the
bar examination, to discover defects and to suggest improvements.' Such
studies could be conducted by the state itself, as in California and New




'Note 63 supra, and accompanying text.
""ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAw SCHOOLS, PROGRAM AND REPORTS OF CoMMrrTEES FoR
THE 1958 ANxuAL MEETIG 52, 54.
'"Note 105 supra, § 11, at 54.
'"Note 105 supra, § 25, at 56.
luNote 105 8upra, § 26, at 57.
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Relative Past Performance of Applicants on the
Montana Bar Examination
1936 to 1951
The Honorable Lee Metcalf, writing in the 1952 Montana Law Re-
view in his then capacity of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
Montana, exhaustively analyzed and compared the performance of Mon-
tana bar examinees with their respective extent and type of training, both
legal and pre-legal. His article contained tables of statistics for first,
second, third and fourth attempts at the bar examination.'
During the fifteen-year period covered by these statistics, only 298
persons took the bar examination. When that group is broken down into
the twenty categories of training which Mr. Justice Metcalf used to evaluate
relative performance, some of the categories contain so few persons that
percentages are not very meaningful. But with this limitation in mind,
his statistics, converted to passing percentages, seem to establish several
fairly reliable conclusions:
(1) That applicants qualifying with a degree from an ABA-approved
law school consistently performed better than any other group;
(2) That the next best were those applicants who had studied two or
more years in an ABA-approved law school.
(3) That the next in line, and so closely parallel as to offer no valid
distinction, were most of the law office students and the corre-
spondence school students;
(4) That those groups who consistently did the poorest on the exami-
nation were:
(a) holders of degrees from non-approved law schools, and
(b) those law office and correspondence school students who re-
lied on an "equivalency" test to fulfill their pre-law study
requirements.
These conclusions are butressed by the previously cited opinion of
the present Chairman of the Montana State Board of Law Examiners that
graduates of "a law school of standing" have about a three to one better
chance of passing the examination than a correspondence school graduate
or a law office student.'"
1952 to 1957
No statistics comparable to those compiled by Mr. Justice Metcalf for
the period up to 1951 are apparently currently available. However, his
statistics are recent enough that current statistics would very likely be
closely comparable.
Performance on the Montana bar examination from 1952 through 1957,
.bfbroken down into groups taking the examination for the first time and
'Note 100 supra, at 5, 7, 8.
uoNote 38 supra, and accompanying text.
1959] NOTES
21
Willey: Montana Bar Admission Standards
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1958
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
groups of repeaters, and compared with the national average performance,
is shown on the following table :"
Year 1st timers passing repeaters passing Mont. avg. National passing
number per cent number per cent average
1952 11 64% 7 57% 61% 59%
1953 16 69% 3 0% 58% 60%
1954 11 56% 2 0% 46% 56%
1955 11 64% 5 40% 56% 59%
1956 12 83% 4 50% 75% 59%
1957 13 54% 5 40% 50% 61%
Admissions on Motion
During the years 1953 through 1957, seventeen out-of-state attorneys
were admitted to the Montana bar on motion. The break-down by years
is as follows: 1953, eight; 1954, one; 1955, four; 1956, two, and 1957,
two.'
SHOULD THE DIPLOMA PRIVILEGE FOR MONTANA STATE
UNIVERSITY LAW GRADUATES BE RETAINED?
As previously indicated, since 1915 graduates of the Montana State
University School of Law have been admitted on motion, without examina-
tion. This privilege has always been subject to the right of the Chief
Justice to require examination, but that power has apparently never been
exercised.
Factors Opposing Retention of the Privilege
"The American Bar Association is of the opinion that graduation
from a law school should not confer the right of admission to the bar, and
that every candidate should be subject to an examination by public
authority to determine fitness." The proposed Code of Recommended
Standards for Bar Examiners also takes the position that no one should
be admitted without examination unless he has previously been admitted
to the Bar of "another American or common-law jurisdiction.""' The
ABA has been consistent in its opposition since 1892.' In 1940 a com-
mittee of the Association of American Law Schools recommended that the
diploma privilege be discouraged, but the Association itself has appar-
ently never approved this particular recommendation.'
".From tables published by the National Conference of Bar Examiners: 1952, 22
BAR EXAM. 122-125 (1953); 1953, 23 BAR EXAM. 148-150 (1954); 1954, 24 BAR
EXAM. 113-115 (1955); 1955, 25 BAR EXAM. 114-117 (1956) ; 1956, 27 BAR EXAM.
42-45 (1958) ; 1957, 27 BAR EXAM. 94-97 (1958).
"2Tables published in 27 BAR EXAM. 46-47, 98-99 (1958).
1Standards of the American Bar Associaton, RuLEs FOR ADMI13SION TO THE BAR
7 (West 1957). See also note 103 supra, at 103.
'"Note 105 supra, § 14, at 55.
"SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION, BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS FOR




Montana Law Review, Vol. 20 [1958], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/6
NOTES
There is no doubt that the enforced comprehensive review attendant
on a bar examination has beneficial effects. Further, requiring Montana
law graduates to take the bar examination would increase the percentage
of law graduates taking the examination, and thereby increase the com-
petition against examinees who had not attended or graduated from ap-
proved law schools. This increased competition might indirectly raise
admission standards.
Two jurisdictions-Florida and South Dakota-have abandoned the
diploma privilege in recent rules changes. Florida repealed its diploma
privilege statute in 1951 at the instance of the state bar association." The
reasons for doing so, according to the Chairman of the Florida State Board
of Law Examiners, were as follows :'
Florida is such an attractive place in which to live that many out
of state students attend our schools. The diploma privilege
brought an inordinate number of these students. Some were un-
desirables but they were permitted to attend and graduate from
law school. Under the diploma privilege the applicant was re-
quired to satisfy the board with regard to his moral fitness. But
in this respect the examiners were severely handicapped because
the applicant was a graduate of an approved law school and in
doubtful cases the tendency was toward granting a license. An-
other evil of the diploma privilege was its effect upon the quality
of work in the law schools. To some extent there was removed
from the law schools and the professors the force and advantage of
competition.
South Dakota abandoned the diploma privilege in its rules change of
1957,' but this author has been unable to discover what specific reasons
prompted that change.
Factors Favoring Montana's Retention of the Diploma Privilege
Mr. Justice Metcalf, in his 1952 law review article, felt that the
diploma privilege should be retained in this state because:'
(1) "The standards, both for pre-legal and actual law study are
higher for graduates of the Montana law school than for applicants to
take the bar examination."
(2) "Montana has a relatively small law school and it is the only
one in the state. The Chief Justice is well acquainted with the instruc-
tors, familiar with the type of instruction given at the school, and able
to determine accurately that standards are being maintained."
(3) "The Montana graduates who appear before the court measure
up in training and ability as lawyers with the graduates of out-of-state
schools who are practicing in the state."
(4) Between 1936 and 1951 seven students with only two years of
study at the Montana law school passed the bar examination. "Two of
n"FLA. STAT. §§ 454.03, 454.031 (1951).
"'Watts, Cutrrent Status of Admissions in Florida, 23 BAR EXAM. 99, 107 (1954).
'"New Rules in South Dakota, 26 BAR EXAM. 91, 92 (1957).
"*Note 100 supra, at 10, 11.
19591
23
Willey: Montana Bar Admission Standards
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1958
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
the seven had less than a passing average in law school." (Since 1951 at
least one other student who left the Montana State University School of
Law at the end of his first year with less than a passing average passed
the Montana bar after a second year of study at another law school.)
"Taken along with other evidence, these results indicate that a man who
is able to graduate from the Montana law school is able to pass the bar
examination."
Another factor bearing on evaluation of the desirability of retaining
the diploma privilege is that in recent years the law school Board of Vis-
itors, composed of outstanding judges and lawyers from throughout the
state, have semi-annually evaluated the law school's policies and standards,
and have done some classroom visiting. This additional check tends to
insure maintainence of standards within the school.
The diploma privilege is not unique to Montana. Five other states
regularly admit graduates of their own schools on motion ; 1 ten additional
states admit their own graduates in "emergencies," or under special rules
for veterans or persons entering military service.'
The number of Montana law graduates admitted on motion under the
the diploma privilege during the years 1952 through 1957 is as follows:
1952, forty; 1953, thirty-two; 1954, twenty-five; 1955, twenty-three; 1956,
sixteen; 1957, twenty-two.TM
Two final factors-the opinions of members of the Montana State
Board of Law Examiners, and the report of the ABA inspector who
evaluated the law school for accreditation in 1957-are also worthy of con-
sideration in determining whether the diploma privilege should be con-
tinued.
Mr. Edward C. Mulroney, Missoula attorney and member of the Board
of Law Examiners until April 1, 1959, has said he is satisfied that if a man
can graduate from the Montana State University School of Law, he is
adequately prepared to practice in Montana, and that no bar examination
need be administered to graduates of this law school.' Mr. Ralph J. An-
derson, Chairman of the Board of Law Examiners, concurred, with one
reservation, in the following words :'
As to whether graduates of the Law School should all be required
to take the [bar] examination, it is my considered opinion that
those who make good grades in law school should not be required
to take the examination but those students who take one or two ad-
ditional years to complete the course in law school should be re-
quired to take the examination.
"Ala., La., Miss., W. Va., Wis. See table in 27 BAR EXAM. 46, 47 (1958).
22Cal., Colo., Ind., Kan., Minn., N.Y., Okla., Pa., Tex., Wash. See table 27 BAR
EXAM. 46, 47 (1958). However, only five of these states-Ind., N.Y., Okla., Tex.,
Wash-admitted graduates under these special rules in 1957. See table in 27
BAR EXAM. 98-99 (1958).
"0See tables in 25 BAR EXAM. 118-119 (1956) and 27 BAR EXAM. 98-99 (1958). Satis-
tics on admissions under the diploma privilege for the years 1936 through 1951
may be found in Mr. Justice Metcalf's article, note 100 8upra, at 9 and n.18.
"'Interview with Mr. Mulroney by the author, confirmed by Mr. Mulroney's reading
this Note in its final form.
2Letter, note 38 supra.
[Vol. 20,
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Mr. John Hervey, in his American Bar Association Inspection Report
on the Montana State University School of Law,' said:
The school is to be commended for selective admissions. The
"diploma privilege" exists in Montana for the graduates of the
school and it, therefore, exact9 high scholastic and moral qualifica-
tions for admission. This requirement should prove fruitful and
should be continued.
In a subsequent letter he added:'
I was especially impressed with the high standards of admission
and scholarship which you maintain in the law school.
Mr. Hervey's conclusions, taken together with the views of our bar
examiners, would seem to indicate that Florida's reasons for abandoning
the diploma privilege' are not problems in Montana at present.
TRENDS OF RECENT RULES CHANGES IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS
New admission rules adopted by other states during the past eight
years provide at least a partial indication of current trends in this area.
The following is a brief summary of changes which were adopted by more
than one jurisdiction since 1951 :'
Character Investigations of All Applicants Required
Michigan adopted this requirement in 1953; Tennessee adopted it in
1956 (including both a questionnaire and a local bar association investiga-
tion) ; Missouri promulgated this requisite in 1958.
All Applicants Must Submit Fingerprints
This was adopted by Michigan in 1953, Ohio in 1957, and Missouri (as
an optional requirement which the examiners may impose) in 1958.
All Examinees Must Be Graduates of Law Schools Approved by the
ABA or AALS
This requisite was prescribed by Alaska in 1955, by South Dakota in
1957, by South Carolina (with an exception for its own state schools) in
1958, and by Kansas, effective in 1960. The 1955 Report of the Ohio Legal
"The Inspection Report is quoted in part in The Dean's Report to the President, 5
MONTANA STATEI UNIv sRsTY LAW ScHooL NEWS 4 (August 1958).
""Ibid.
'Text accompanying note 118 supra.
'"Rules changes of the various jurisdictions are contained in the following: Hep-
burn, Character and Fitness-Not a Myth, 34 MIcH. S.B.J. 29 (1955); Watts,
Current Status of Admissions in Florida, 23 BAR EXAM. 99, 106-107 (1954) ; New
Rules in Alaska, 25 BAR EXAM. 2 (1956) ; Mississippi Moves, 23 BAR EXAM. 117,
118 (1954) ; Tennessee is Stressing Character, 25 BAa EXAM. 87 (1956) ; Registra-
tion Requirement in Ohio, 26 BAR EXAM. 134 (1957) ; New Rules in South Dakota,
26 BAR EXAM. 91 (1957) ; Missouri Adopts Registration Requirement for Law Stu-
dent.s, 27 BAR EXAM. 100 (1958) ; New Rules in South Carolina, 26 BAR EXAM. 129
(1957) ; Kansas Keeps Up, 25 BAR EXAM. 76 (1956) ; Report of Ohio Legal Educa-
tion Committee, 24 BAR EXAM. 118, 128 (1955).
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Education Committe also urged that the Ohio State Bar Association peti-
tion that state's supreme court to obtain adoption of the standard, but no
action has apparently yet been taken to make the recommended change.
Law Office Study Abolished as a Means of Qualifying to Take the Bar
Examination
This action was taken by Alaska in 1955 (except for office clerkships
previously begun), by South Dakota in 1957, and by South Carolina in
1958.
Action on the Diploma Privilege
This privilege was abolished by Florida in 1951 and by South Dakota
in 1957. But it was expressly preserved by Mississippi's admissions statute
of 1954.
Other Significant Changes
Four other actions, each taken by only a single state, are significant.
The Tennessee Bar Association's Committee on Legal Education and Ad-
mission to the Bar has twice proposed a major modification. In 1953 and
again in 1955 the committee recommended that every license to practice
law in Tennessee be provisional for the first five years, and lapse auto-
matically at the end of that time if the holder of the license was not, dur-
ing the five-year period, engaged in the practice of law or the rendition
of legal services to a government agency, trust company, or the like.'
The Tennessee rules apparently have not been amended to incorporate the
recommendation. If adopted it would require that lawyers who had been
away from practice during their first five years following admission would
have to retake the examination as a condition to later reentering practice.
Another important change was made by the new 1958 rules in South
Carolina. Thaat state now precludes an examinee from taking the bar
more than three times.' As of 1957, a majority of thirty-one states im-
posed some sort of limitation on the number of times an applicant could
take the bar examination, and one author adovcated a general limit of two
attempts.10
South Dakota's 1957 rules change included the requirement that at-
torneys from out-of-state, seeking admission on motion, have practiced five
years elsewhere.'
Missouri in 1958 adopted a requirement that all law students who
contemplate taking the bar examination of that state must register with
the state supreme court within ninety days of the time they begin their
law studies.'
"'1953 Report of Tennessee Committee, 23 BAR EXAM. 25 (1954) ; State Activities
and Recommendations, 24 BAR EXAM. 142, 145 (1955).
1"New Rules in South Carolina, 26 BAR EXAM. 129 (1957).
-''Eckler, How Many Times Should an Applicant Be Permitted to Take a Bar Emami-
nation?, 26 BAR EXAM. 28 (1957). As of the date of this article, 18 states imposed
no limit, 5 states limited an applicant to 5 tries, 12 states had a limit of 4, 13jurisdictions imposed a 3-time Umit, and one-New Hampshire-allowed only 2
examination attempts.
'"New Rules in South Dakota, 26 BAR EXAM. 91 (1957).
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WOULD ANY CHANGE OF RULES IN MONTANA
REQUIRE LEGISLATIVE ACTION?
If it is ultimately determined that the rules for admission to the Mon-
tana bar should be changed, there is a problem as to whether such a change
would have to be made by legislative enactment or whether the Supreme
Court of Montana has inherent power to set the standards for admissions
of attorneys, regardless of what the legislature has provided. Any change
would probably involve a modification of the present standard requiring
only two years of law study. That standard is established by R.C.M. 1947,
section 93-2002, which provides in part that "every applicant for admis-
sion as an attorney and counselor must produce ... a certificate of one or
more reputable counselors-at-law that he has been engaged in the study of
law for two successive years prior to the making of such application."
This statute becomes more significant in light of the accompanying
provision of section 93-2007 that "the supreme court may establish rules
for the admission of attorneys and counselors not inconsistent with this
chapter." (Emphasis added.)
The quoted portions of both of these statutes have remained unchanged
since their original enactment in the 1895 Code of Civil Procedure. Further,
the Montana Supreme Court has acquiesced in the standard set by section
93-2002 since 1896.10
Montana Cases
A number of decisions of the Supreme Court of Montana have dealt
with the source of the power to admit individuals to the practice of law.
With two possible exceptions, they have uniformly indicated that the court
does not consider itself as having exclusive power over admission stand-
ards. The early case in In re Bailey' stated that the practice of law was
"subject entirely to state control." This impliedly recognizes legislative
competence in the area. This view was stated more explicity in State v.
Merchants' Credit Service, Inc., where the court said, "this court is by
statute given the exclusive power to confer upon any persons the right to
practice law. . . ." (Emphasis added.)' The next case decided on this
point, In re unification of the Montana Bar Assn., left even less doubt when
it stated:'
This court, under and within the terms of our Constitution and
the statutes of this state, has the power and authority to adopt,
promulgate and enforce all necessary, proper and appropriate rules
for its own government and for the admission and regulation of
attorneys at law in the state of Montana. This the court has done
from its inception.
The most recent Montana decision dealing with this area, Petition of
Bergen, decided in 1951, stated per curiam, "admissions to the bar of this
mRuizs OF THE SUPREME COURT OF M1'NTANA, 16 Mont. 587, 601 (1896), Rule XVII 1.
'50 Mont. 365, 369, 146 Pac. 1101, 1103 (1915).
m104 Mont. 76, 94, 66 P.2d 337, 339 (1937).
u107 Mont. 559, 562, 87 P.2d 172, 173 (1939).
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state are governed by the provisions of our codes and of rules of court
promulgated by this tribunal."'
The 1935 decision of In re Hansen seems at first glance to be directly
contrary to the other Montana cases. It expressly approves decisions from
other jurisdictions which state that :'
[A]ttorneys are officers of the court; they may be admitted to
practice only by authority of the court; and it is universally held
that courts have inherent power over members of the bar over and
above statutory provisions. . . This power may be likened to the
power of a legislative body to exercise summary powers over its
membership. It is an inherent power and may be exercised under
the principles of common law on the theory that it is the court's
prerogative to control its own officers.
The Hansen case involved a disciplinary action against an attorney, so it
may well be that the court intended only to affirm its inherent power to
discipline its officers, without regard to its powers relating to admissions.
The subsequent decision of In re McDonald cites the Hansen case for the
proposition that "in any event this court has power to take action to
discipline its officers."'" Hence neither of these cases was probably in-
tended to contradict the otherwise consistent position of the court that
the source of its admissions powers lies in constitutional and statutory
grants.
The General Rule Elsewhere
Cases up to 1943 on the question of the power of the legislature re-
specting admissions to the bar are exhaustively discussed and analyzed in
an annotation in 144 A.L.R. 150. The author of that discussion concludes
that notwithstanding the doctrine of separation of powers, the state legis-
lature is generally recognized as having authority under its police power
to enact reasonable statutes regulating admissions of attorneys to the prac-
tice of law. However, the actual act of admission is generally recognized
to be exclusively judicial, so that the state supreme court may reject an
applicant on the ground of unfitness, even though he has complied with
the statutory standards. In some jurisdictions, legislative enactments gov-
erning admission standards are given effect by the courts solely as a matter
of comity or courtesy.
The leading western decision in this area is Brydonjack v. State Bar
of California.' It held that the legislature had power to prescribe ad-
mission standards, so long as the statutes did not materially impair the
exercise of constitutional functions of the courts. But the case also recog-
nized that admission itself is a judicial function, and that the court was
not bound by the recommendation of an examining board created by the
legislature.
Several recent cases from the surrounding western states of Arizona,
'125 Mont. 607, 608, 233 P.2d 399, 400 (1951).
"W101 Mont. 490, 501, 54 P.2d 882, 887 (1936).
1'112 Mont. 129, 137, 113 P.2d 790, 793 (1941).
"2208 Cal. 439, 281 Pac. 1018, 1020, 66 A.L.R. 1507, 1509, 1510 (1929).
[Vol. 20,
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Idaho, Kansas, and Washington are in accord with the general rule stated
in the A.L.R. discussion.'" Utah and possibly New lexico have recently
reaffirmed the general rule, too, though with the reservation that the ulti-
mate power over admission is in the courts.'"
The federal courts follow the rule that the judiciary has exclusive con-
trol over the standards for the admission of attorneys; , Indiana is typical
of a few state courts which take the same position.'"
However, the view which seems most appropriate to the situation now
existing in Montana is that expressed by the Supreme Court of Florida
in Petition of Florida State Bar Ass'n."' The court there affirmed its
inherent power over admissions of attorneys, but held that inasmuch as it
had acquiesced in legislative regulation of the area for more than 100 years,
any new requirements should be prescribed by the legislature. The Montana
Snpreme Court has acquiesced in legislative regulation of admissions, at
least as to the basic standards, for 63 years.
A few years after the Florida court took the above position, the legis-
lature abdicated the field and gave the court exclusive power to regulate
admissions," though it reserved the right to reenter the field at a later
date. In 1957 the legislature of South Carolina expressly recognized the
inherent power of its state supreme court over bar admission standards,
and repealed all the legislative enactments in the field.'"
If a state supreme court acts in direct opposition to the wishes of the
state legislature in regard to admission standards, the legislature may force
the court into a very awkward position. For example, a few years back
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts adopted a rule which limited
admission applicants to four attempts at the bar examination. The legis-
lature then passed a statute forbidding any such limitation. At that point
the court rescinded its rule.'
'"Application of Courtney, 83 Ariz. 231, 319 P.2d 991, 992, 993 (1957), affirmed legis-
lative power to control admission standards, though with the reservation stated in
the Brydonjack case, note 144 supra; Application of Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 206
P.2d 528, 539 (1949), affirmed the legislative power to fix minimum but not maxi-
mum standards; In re Cox, 164 Kan. 160, 188 P.2d 652, 657 (1948), acquiesced in
absolute legislative control over admission standards; State ex rel. Laughlin v.
Washington State Bar Ass'n., 26 Wash. 2d 914, 176 P.2d 301, 303 (1947), recog-
nized legislative competence to regulate judicial admissions, but not to deprive the
judiciary of power in that area.
'"Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 102 Utah 548, 133 P.2d 325, 330 (1943) ; Henington v. State
Board of Bar Examiners, 60 N.M. 393, 291 P.2d 1108, 1110 (1956) (by implication).
'"Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1856) ; Laughlin v. Clephane, 77 F.
Supp. 103, 105, 106 (D.D.C. 1947). CIf. Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333,
378, 379 (1866) ; Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 523, 535 (1868).
'"In re Day, 181 Ill. 73, 54 N.E. 646, 651-53 (1899).
".134 Fla. 851, 186 So. 280, 285, 286 (1938).
'"FLA. STAT. § 454.021 (1955).
'"Inherent Power of the Court in South Carolina. 26 BAR EXAM. 103 (1957).
'wEckler, note 134 supra, at 31.
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CONCLUSION
In summary, Montana's admission standards are deficient in the fol-
lowing areas:
(1) In permitting applicants to establish pre-legal education re-
quirements by an "equivalency" examination. Montana is also behind
the current trend, though on a par with many other jurisdictions, in re-
quiring only two years of pre-legal study.
(2) In permitting applicants to qualify for the bar examination
through correspondence study.
(3) In permitting applicants to satisfy the legal education require-
ments by two years study exclusively in a law office. Most of the minority
of states which permit office study require more time than Montana does,
and much more extensive supervision.
(4) In allowing two years of law school study to qualify an ap-
plicant. The majority of jurisdictions now require either three years of
law school or that all applicants be law school graduates; and most of these
jurisdictions also require that the law school be approved either by the
American Bar Association (or Association of American Law Schools), or
by a state approving agency. Only Georgia also accepts two years of law
school.
(5) In allowing attorneys admitted to practice in other jurisdictions
to be admitted on motion in Montana after only two years practice in their
former jurisdictions. The average requirement is five years practice
elsewhere.
(6) In permitting an applicant to take the bar examination an in-
definite number of times.
Montana is behind the current trends, though still on a par with the
majority of jurisdictions, in the following areas:
(1) In not requiring all law students who intend to take the bar
examination to register with the bar examining authority at the time
they begin their law studies.
(2) In not requiring a character investigation or verified character
questionnaire on all applicants. There is a relatively new trend which
Montana also has not yet adopted, but which is in force in a few jurisdic-
tions, requiring fingerprinting of all applicants.
(3) In not periodically evaluating the efficacy of the bar examina-
tion.
(4) In not taking greater advantage of the national bar examination
question and answer pool.
Montana is on a par with the majority of jurisdictions and in keep-
ing with the current trends in these areas:





Montana Law Review, Vol. 20 [1958], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol20/iss2/6
Montana's requirements in the entire area of admissions by reciprocity,
excepting the number of years practice required, are more stringent and
exacting than the standards in a number of other states. The present rules
probably will require no alteration in the existing requirements of the
N.C.B.E. character investigation, the detailed affidavit reporting any prior
professional delinquencies, and the certificate of good standing from the
presiding judge of the supreme court of the applicant's former jurisdiction.
These comments made by Mr. Justice Metcalf in 1952 are still ap-
plicable to the status of our bar admission standards:'
The place to begin to tighten up admission requirements
would appear to be in establishing stricter standards for permis-
sion to take the bar examination.. . . I am afraid that our loose
interpretation of the rule allowing applicants to offer equivalent
study or experience for academic pre-legal training holds out false
hopes for most of the applicants who do not have adequate prep-
aration ...
[I]t would appear that what is needed is not a piece-meal
amendment but a re-evaluation of the whole process ...
[T]he initiative for needed changes in the court rules and ex-
amination procedures should come in this state from the Montana
Bar Association.
CHARLES W. WILLEY
PROCEDURES FOR SUPPRESSING ILLEGALLY SEIZED EVIDENCE
THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
At common law, evidence which had been seized illegally was never-
theless admissible if otherwise competent. This rule was generally ac-
cepted by American courts until the United States Supreme Court, in
Weeks v. United States,' held that the introduction at a trial of evidence
obtained through an unreasonable search and seizure nullifies the rights
guaranteed by the fourth amendment to the Constitution, and that timely
application for return of the property should be granted, thus preventing
its use in evidence. The Court has subsequently suggested that this rule,
known as the "exclusionary rule," is not a mandate of the fourth amend-
ment, but is a judicially created rule of evidence implied from the fourth
amendment.!
Even if the exclusionary rule were considered a mandate of the fourth
amendment, that amendment binds only the federal government. Never-
theless, following the Weeks case many states have voluntarily adopted a
'wNote 100 supra, at 10-12.
'232 U.S. 383 (1914).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
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